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 “Contrasting Models of the God-World Relationship: Avicenna, Maimonides and  
Al-Shahrastānī” 
ABSTRACT: This essay considers Avicenna’s conception of God as the ‘Necessary 
Existent’ and the subsequent uses of this designation in the thinking of Moses Maimonides 
and Muhammad Al-Shahrastānī. Specifically, it considers how this term affects each 
thinker’s understanding of God’s being ‘above perfection,’ as suggested by their respective 
intimations regarding what they take to be His most prominent attribute. In turn, these 
distinct understandings influence their contrasting models of the relationship between God 
and the created order. I demonstrate how Avicenna employs his modal categories in order 
to determine God’s attributes, pinpointing ‘necessity’ as the attribute that he highlights as 
best reflecting God’s perfection. As a result, he conceives of the relation between God and 
the created order as one of ‘ambiguous univocality.’ By contrast, Maimonides’ model takes 
God’s ‘incomparability’ as His fundamental attribute, which in turn necessitates an 
equivocal relation between God and world. Al-Shahrastānī pushes this equivocality to its 
logical extreme by arguing for God’s radical ‘independence’ from the created order. In 
doing so, he not only exposes the ‘weak’ nature of God’s transcendence in Maimonides’ 
thinking. However, I argue that the attacks Al-Shahrastānī and Maimonides direct at 
Avicenna either can all be resolved within his system of the modal categories or miss their 
mark entirely as a result of misinterpreting some aspect of his thinking. Illustrating one 
such misinterpretation, I conclude the essay by examining the incompatibility between 
Maimonides’ understanding of God’s ‘attributes of action’ and his continued use of the 
term ‘Necessary Existent’ with reference to God. 
 
 In the eighth book of his Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna considers the 
attributes of the Necessary Existent. In doing so, he draws on his earlier discourse wherein 
he demonstrates that the Necessary Existent “has no cause,” so as to be necessary “in all 
[His] aspects.”1 As such, He is “neither changing nor multiple, and has nothing associated 
with His existence that is proper to Himself.”2 Although His existence is ‘not dependent on 
relation,’ Avicenna also argues that He is “the principle of the necessitation of the existence 
of everything” that is merely possible in itself.3 These two aspects of the Necessary Existent 
are best encapsulated in Avicenna’s assertion that He is above perfection as a whole 
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“because not only does He have the existence that belongs only to Him, but every other 
existence also is an overflow of His existence,” such that they belong to Him as emanating 
from Him.4  
 Avicenna’s intention in his investigation is to show “that a range of traditional 
divine attributes are implied by the fundamental trait of necessity,” thereby integrating the 
Necessary Existent derived from his proof into a larger “philosophical account of the God 
of Islam.”5 Later thinkers, including the Islamic theologian Muhammad Al-Shahrastānī 
and the Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides, will appropriate Avicenna’s classification of 
God as the ‘Necessary Existent’ in their own writings. Moreover, they will assent to his 
notion of God as being ‘above perfection.’ However, despite endorsing these principles, 
both thinkers conceive of God and His attributes in such a way as to stand in complete 
opposition to their philosophical predecessor. I contend that this divergence stems from 
their contrasting models of how existence is predicated of God as necessary and the created 
order as contingent. Accordingly, despite the fact that all of them recognize that God’s 
attributes cannot exist in relation to one another in such away as to indicate composition 
within Him, the conceptions of God’s existence that they present are structured around 
what they take to be His most characteristic attribute, which in turn informs the nature of 
His other properties. These varying ‘primary’ attributes correspondingly suggest the 
meanings they assign to God’s being ‘above perfection.’ Al-Shahrastānī’s model is 
undoubtedly far more rigorous that Maimonides’ own, such that he effectively safeguards 
God’s radical incomparability. Ultimately however, I will argue that, insofar as Avicenna 
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approaches the issue from the metaphysical standpoint of God’s necessity, he is afforded a 
positive philosophical understanding of His existence and attributes that is wholly lacking 
in the thinking of his counterparts. As a result, Avicenna is able to develop a fuller 
understanding of God’s causal role without at all detracting from His transcendence and 
self-sufficiency. 
 For my purposes at hand, it would obviously prove impossible to completely 
examine the methodology each thinker employs in predicating attributes of God and the 
full extent of their opposition. Accordingly, for the sake of expediency and clarity, I will 
endeavour to encapsulate the main principles of their thinking, so as to first convey how 
each conceives of the existential relation between God and the created order before turning 
to their corresponding implied designations of God’s primary attribute. Significantly, in 
highlighting what I believe to be each thinker’s classification of God’s most characteristic 
feature, I will not investigate each and every attribute they predicate of God, but rather 
intend to focus on the method they employ in deriving these attributes. Moreover, I will not 
present the thinkers in chronological order, but rather, after having examined Avicenna’s 
thinking at considerable length, aim to convey how Al-Shahrastānī pushes the 
transcendental understanding of God common to him and Maimonides to its extreme. 
Subsequently, I will return to Avicenna to consider how his model is able to implicitly 
address the criticisms leveled against it by his successors, as well as its superiority in this 
regard.    
 Returning to Avicenna’s two assertions presented in the Healing concerning the 
Necessary Existent, not only do they serve as the means by which he goes about 
determining God’s attributes, but they also indicate an important aspect of His mode of 
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existence. Avicenna rejects “the view that ‘exist’ has two different senses when applied to 
God and the world,” firmly holding to “the univocality of existence.”6 Nonetheless, he still 
insists “that the original and the borrowed forms of existence can never be the same and 
that the contingent can never shed its contingency even while it exists.”7 A possible and 
necessary existent are fundamentally differentiated from one another insofar as the former, 
when considered in itself with respect to its essence, is “within the bound of possibility.”8 
Neither its existing or not existing are logically necessary, such that it cannot be the source 
of its own actual existence, but rather “its existence and nonexistence are both due to a 
cause” external to it.9  
 To this end, Avicenna contends that “the possible in itself must become necessary 
through a cause and with respect to it” and, as demonstrated in his proof, these causes 
must ultimately terminate in the Necessary Existent as first cause.10  This assertion is 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, it indicates that God as necessary and creatures as 
contingent exist in different modal categories and therefore can neither be said to exist nor 
to possess the perfections of existence identically. God’s mode of having perfections is 
“characterized by simplicity, necessity, fullness and purity,” whereas “creatures have them 
in a composite, accidental and limited manner.”11 However, it also suggests that, as the 
source and principle of all caused existence, God has a positive relation to the cosmos as a 
whole, whereby it exists with respect to Him.  
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 The different modes in which created beings and God have their properties can be 
understood with reference to Avicenna’s discussion of priority and posteriority with 
respect to causes and effects. He is clear that these terms are predicated in many different 
forms, but all unite ambiguously “in the fact that to the prior inasmuch as it is prior 
belongs something not possessed by the posterior.”12 Conversely, “nothing belongs to the 
posterior unless it also exists for the prior.”13 Accordingly, the prior cause contains all the 
perfections of the posterior effects that it generates without being limited by them insofar 
as it contains them within the same order of measure, but at a higher degree. Significantly, 
Avicenna maintains that, with respect to place and time, the prior “is that which is closest 
to a determinate starting point.”14 Summarizing his thinking, Rahim Acar argues that, 
generally speaking, the same property can be predicated of different things “according to 
priority and posteriority depending on the distance between the thing in question and the 
measure or principle.”15 Correspondingly, God brings creatures into existence “either in a 
primary manner or through an intermediary,” in such a way as to act as the cause of the 
existence of things that are only possible in themselves.16 Although these effects could never 
actually exist except through the mediation of God’s causal priority, and therefore can 
never attain the same degree of existence as Him, He is not restricted by this relation.17 
Rather, God is a self-subsisting existent and “fully actual without succession,” so as to be 
neither subject to change nor “bound to time.”18 
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  In this respect, Avicenna’s thinking here is best illustrated via his cosmology, which 
in turn illuminates the nature of God’s causal priority. Building on his principle that the 
more prior a thing is the greater degree of some property it contains, he presents a four-
tiered hierarchy of existence. Following the initial distinction between the Necessary 
Existent and contingent beings, Avicenna contends that at the highest level of pure 
contingency there are the eternal celestial intelligences, which move the spheres below them 
in their perpetual circular motion. Finally, there is the spatiotemporal world of the 
sublunar realm wherein everything that is generated and destroyed is “always preceded by 
potentiality and the carrier of potentiality, matter.” 19  Whereas the lowest form of 
contingent existence always exists within the flow of time “in a condition of lapse and 
renewal,” celestial being exists concurrently with time insofar as its existence is not 
preceded by its constitutive matter, but rather by absolute non-existence.20 To this end, as 
the celestial spheres exist in a state of ‘perpetuity’ contained within God’s own ‘eternity,’ 
His causality has existential and not temporal priority, as in the case of Avicenna’s famous 
example: “when Zayd moved his hand, the key moved.”21 Indeed, his model of the modal 
terms is such that they do not have to be framed within a temporal context, but rather can 
examine God’s causation from a metaphysical standpoint in its absolute primacy.  
 Thus, I have exhibited that God and the created order exist in what Avicenna 
describes as an ‘ambiguous’ relation to one another. Considered in His role as cause, God 
is the principle of contingent existence and existential properties, but contains these 
properties to a degree that is wholly unattainable by creatures owing to His nature as 
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necessarily uncaused. Avicenna utilizes these two traits in order to derive His attributes. He 
pinpoints the former as God’s “primary attribute,” which consists in His being a ‘that He 
is’ and an existent.22 In turn, it indicates that “if an existent is necessary, then everything 
about it must be necessary,” such that its “features must flow inevitably from its true 
nature.”23 Accordingly, Avicenna argues that God’s nature as uncaused not only conveys 
His absolute existence and self-subsistence, but also negatively exhibits what attributes He 
cannot possess and the impossibility of establishing relationships of equality to Him.24  In 
addition to this ‘intrinsic’ consideration of the Necessary Existent, which highlights His 
uniqueness, simplicity and ineffability amongst other attributes, he also employs the 
‘extrinsic’ characteristic of His being the principle ‘cause’ of the created order as the basis 
for establishing relations between necessary and contingent existence. Avicenna argues that 
God is deserving of the epithets ‘king’ and ‘generous’ insofar as He “gives without need,” 
graciously imparting existence onto contingent effects without goal or purpose.25 In certain 
cases, he also combines elements from both of these traits, so as to frame the Necessary 
Existent as the ‘end’ of the created order, as in the case of His goodness.26  
 Summarizing his thinking, Avicenna asserts that God has “attributes that intermix 
with negation,” whereby in designating Him as ‘one,’ “he would mean only this existence 
itself, where either quantitative or categorical division,” as well as all composition, “is 
negated of Him.”27 Conversely, He also contains positive attributes that are independent of 
negations and relations, such as his nature as an intelligible as a result of being uncaused. 
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Nonetheless, the former has the same degree of necessity as the latter because they are 
“necessary concomitants of the essence,” existing “after the existence of the essence.”28  
 By contrast, although Maimonides affirms Avicenna’s designation of God as the 
Necessary Existent, he accuses his philosophical predecessor of not holding to his first 
principles with respect to his investigation of God’s attributes. Insofar as God’s essence is 
wholly incomprehensible and his attributes are identical with His essence to the extent that 
He admits of no multiplicity, he decries the possibility of predicating positive attributes of 
God.29 Maimonides therefore maintains that “there is no oneness at all except in believing 
that there is one simple essence in which there is no complexity of multiplication of 
notions.”30 Accordingly, he holds to an equivocality with respect to the relation between 
God and creatures insofar as “none of the existent things that [God] has brought into 
existence resemble” Him nor possess any properties in an identical manner to Him.31 In 
this respect, “God’s absolute dissimilarity or incomparability” is His most characteristic 
attribute, comprising Maimonides’ conception of God’s being ‘above perfection’ and 
constituting “an unfathomable abyss” for the human intellect.32  
 As a result, Maimonides restricts the predication of divine attributes to negations, 
which serve to “conduct the mind towards the utmost reach that man may attain in his 
apprehension of [God].”33 I contend that Maimonides employs this model in order to close 
the space within which to predicate attributes of God in accordance with His absolute 
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existence and self-sufficiency. He contends that such positive affirmations inevitably imply 
“a deficiency in [God],” associating Him “with that which is not He.” 34  As such, 
Maimonides does not frame God’s eternal existence with reference to a positive 
understanding of his necessity, but rather argues that it negatively signifies that His “non-
existence is impossible,” such that “He has no cause that has brought Him into existence.”35 
Moreover, he nullifies the possibility of predicating Avicenna’s third category of attributes, 
whereby God, as simultaneously ‘uncaused’ in Himself and ‘cause’ of contingent existence, 
is the ‘end’ that the created order perpetually strives to achieve, but never attains. God can 
neither be understood positively as engaged in intellection nor as having goodness in a 
manner that can be understood on the same scale as that of the cosmos. Maimonides does 
not assent to Avicenna’s thinking that God’s nature as prior indicates that He contains all 
the properties of that which is posterior to Him within the same order at a higher degree. 
Rather, he places paramount importance on his predecessor’s assertion that God is not 
limited by this causal relation to the extent that he effectively negates the created order’s 
ability to hold any property in common with its creator. 
 However, in comparison to the thinking of Al-Shahrastānī, I assert that 
Maimonides’ model of the relationship between God and the created order is only one of 
‘weak’ transcendence and equivocality. His notion of God’s being above perfection 
highlights His incomparability with respect to His attributes, but not His being above the 
division of existence and non-existence itself. Put simply, although one can never speak of a 
thing’s ‘goodness’ in the same way as God’s own, Maimonides cannot extend this 
dissimilarity to encompass His existence as a whole. Indeed, I argue that his inability to 
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widen the scope of equivocality between God and the created order is implied in the proofs 
for God’s existence he exhibits, all of which are variations on Aristotle’s cosmological 
argument from motion.36 Although contingent existents do not possess properties in an 
identical manner to God, Maimonides must concede that a philosophical consideration of 
their existence can tell one something about God’s existence: not ‘what’ He is, but at the 
very least ‘that’ He is.  
 Al-Shahrastānī presents a far more radical understanding of what he refers to as 
‘pure equivocality.’ To consider one example, Maimonides attributes the characteristics of 
‘living’ and ‘immaterial’ to God in the sense that His “being is not like the being of the 
elements” insofar as He is neither dead nor a body.37 In contrast, Al-Shahrastānī argues 
that God “is living in the sense that He gives life and death.”38 Illustrating this principle, he 
contends that “contraries are litigants and variant things are legal appellants, and their 
Judge is not numbered among either.”39 Rather, he is ‘the truth’ in the sense that “he 
manifests the truth and establishes it” without engaging in disputation, such that the 
litigants would “sometimes be equal to him and at others at variance with him.” 40 
Accordingly, Al-Shahrastānī asserts that “the relation of the universe to the Necessary of 
Existence is in accordance with a single judgement, in which the one and the many,” as well 
as every other form of contrary, “are all equal,” such that “He is powerful over 
everything.”41 However, he does not merely apply this principle of equivocality to God’s 
attributes, but instead extends it in order to assert that “existence could be predicated of 
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God only equivocally, as meaning that He is the giver of existence and its opposite.”42 As 
such, he understands God as the Necessary Existent with reference to His characteristic 
attribute of being ‘absolutely independent.’ Significantly, His independence cannot be 
understood as contrary to dependence, but rather He is above perfection insofar as He 
transcends relations entirely.43  
 In this way, Al-Shahrastānī maintains that the division into necessary and 
contingency “does not apply to the equivocal.”44 Accordingly, these categories cannot be 
employed in either proving God’s existence or deriving His attributes. In surpassing all 
categorization as the source of all contraries, he contends that “the denial of Him is a 
confirmation and the negation of Him is an affirmation.”45 As such, God’s existence cannot 
“be pointed to by anything,” but rather is recognized “through innate predisposition.”46 To 
this end, he contends that “what is mentioned in the divine scriptures [...] is more worthy of 
being followed that the [propositions] of the philosophers,” such that God reveals Himself 
to the human race by way of prophecy.47 In this way, Al-Shahrastānī strips philosophy of 
its ability to know God independently by way of reason insofar as “He is higher than sense 
perception, imagination and intellect.”48 He thereby confines man’s understanding of Him 
to what is made known through revelation, prohibiting “men from delving into the majesty 
of God” and “from disputing about Him and discussing His attributes” in accordance with 
the directives of the prophets.49 
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 Despite these contrary claims, it is my opinion that Avicenna still presents the most 
compelling method of thinking about God’s existence and attributes in relation to the 
created order. In answering the criticisms of Al-Shahrastānī, I argue that he errs in his 
consideration of Avicenna’s proof of God insofar as he conceives of the modal categories of 
‘necessity’ and ‘contingency’ as existing in a contrasting relation to one another. He does 
not grasp that Avicenna conceives of these categories without the presupposition of their 
application to any actually existing things. In this respect, not only can they be considered 
separately from one another, but they also have an absolute primacy over existence 
generally. Indeed, prior to proving the existence of the Necessary Existent, Avicenna 
concedes that, although there are undoubtedly existents that, when considered with respect 
to their essences, are only possible in themselves, the same certainty does not conversely 
apply to what is necessary in itself. In this way, the sense in which necessity and 
contingency are properly metaphysical designations is lost on Al-Shahrastānī. As a result, 
he groups them together with other such contraries as “knowledge and ignorance” or “life 
and death” without recognizing that the modal categories, as prior to these divisions, can 
be employed in order to consider them.50   
 With respect to Maimonides, it is more difficult to pinpoint a single error in his 
reasoning. Significantly, although he contends that attributes “intended for the 
apprehension of His essence” signify “the negation of the privation of the attribute in 
question,” he is willing to concede another category of what he refers to as “attributes of 
action.”51 As he argues in his examination of God’s revelation to Moses at Exodus 33, 
“Moses is pushed back from an ontological revelation of God’s essence towards an ethical 
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and political revelation of His ways.” 52  The ‘thirteen attributes of mercy’ which are 
revealed to Moses can be predicated of God to the extent that the created order exhibits 
certain knowable attributes as His creation. In this way, Maimonides is able to speak 
positively about God in a manner similar to Avicenna insofar as he remains self-conscious 
of the fact that such attributes do not reveal any aspect of His essence, but rather affirm its 
unknowability. 53  He therefore conceives of philosophy as posterior to revelation, 
functioning in a primarily exegetical and political role. It acts to uncover the rational truth 
underlying sacred doctrine, which can in turn be established as principles of divine 
emulation for the benefit of the religious community as a whole.  
 Nonetheless, I maintain that Avicenna’s model is still superior to his Jewish 
counterpart’s because it does not constrain philosophy in a secondary role, but rather 
allows it to operate in conjunction with revelation in such a way as to admit less 
discrepancies between them. Whereas Maimonides “starts from the acceptance of the 
Torah,” such that the operation of his philosophical discourse is curtailed by this initial 
submission, Avicenna acts primarily as a philosopher and so can “suspend his assent” to 
the truth of revelation.54  Accordingly, he is able to present a more logically rigorous 
account of God’s existence and attributes. Moreover, although Maimonides derides his 
philosophical predecessors for abandoning their first principles in trying to formulate 
positive affirmations of God, I contend that he does not himself hold to the full implications 
of assenting to the categorization of God as the ‘Necessary Existent.’ As I have exhibited, 
Avicenna argues that ‘if an existent is necessary, then everything about it must be 
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necessary.’ Maimonides’ model of attributes of action is problematic insofar as it makes a 
distinction between God’s essence and His ways. It posits relational attributes of Him such 
as ‘knowing’ and ‘loving’ with respect to the created order, which do not partake of His 
essential necessity.55 By contrast, Avicenna is able to assert that “the Necessary Existent is 
an intelligible, regardless of whether or not others intellectually apprehend Him; and He is 
loved, regardless of whether He is loved by others or not.”56  
 The discrepancies between these three thinkers is fundamentally linked to their 
divergent understandings of the relationship between God and the created order. Working 
along a spectrum from ‘ambiguous’ univocality to ‘pure’ equivocality, they all structure 
their approaches around what they believe to be God’s most fundamentally characteristic 
attribute, which constitutes His nature as ‘above perfection.’ This designation influences 
God’s relation between His mode of existence and His attributes, as well to the existential 
properties of contingent existents. Correspondingly, it also informs not only the 
correspondence between philosophy and revelation, but also the limits of man’s intellect 
with respect to knowing God and His properties. As I have shown, the attacks Al-
Shahrastānī and Maimonides direct at Avicenna can all either be resolved within his 
system or miss their mark entirely as a result of misinterpreting some aspect of their 
predecessor’s thinking. The former does not grasp that the modal categories do not have to 
be applied to any actually existing things to operate effectively, wrongly including them 
amongst the other actually existing contraries that flow forth from God’s radical 
independence. By contrast, in endeavoring to  posit a class of attributes to allow for divine 
emulation within the religious community, the latter wavers in his conviction to God’s 
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‘necessary’ existence by distinguishing between His essence as such and His acts within the 
world of contingency. Peter Adamson recognizes that Avicenna’s method of determining 
“how exactly necessary existence relates to the divinity [...] was only the beginning” of a 
new chapter in the history of philosophy.57 I agree with him in this respect, but want to 
stress that this does not at all to suggest that Avicenna’s account is in some sense primitive 
or poorly thought out. Rather, it is an elaborate and comprehensive model that is capable 
of effectively answering even the staunchest of criticisms.   
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